you're doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid--not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you've eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked--to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.
In summary, the idea is to try to give all of the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another. (...)
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself--and you are the easiest person to fool. So you have to be very careful about that. After you've not fooled yourself, it's easy not to fool other scientists. You just have to be honest in a conventional way after that.
I would like to add something that's not essential to the science, but something I kind of believe, which is that you should not fool the layman when you're talking as a scientist.
So that's the Feynman scientific ethics. I believe nowadays post modern ethics is more something like, it being dishonest if anything is challenged about AGW but that's not the point right now. Judith Curry found a great old gem in "Shall we tell the whole truth about climate change?"Apparantly there are purists (or maybe Feynmanists) and pragmatists (of maybe Schneiderists)
We find evidence that scientists’ perceptions of the policy process do play a role in shaping their scientific practices. In particular, many of our respondents expressed a preference for keeping discussion of the issue of flux adjustments within the climate modeling community, apparently fearing that climate contrarians would exploit the issue in the public domain. While this may be true, we point to the risk that such an approach may backfire.We also identify assumptions and cultural commitments lying at a deeper level which play at least as important a role as perceptions of the policy process in shaping scientific practices. This leads us to identify two groups of scientists, ‘pragmatists’ and ‘purists’, who have different implicit standards for model adequacy, and correspondingly are or are not willing to use flux adjustments.
(...)But what explains why some climate modellers adopt a purist as opposed to a pragmatist stance? Below we identify four factors which we believe help account for the difference. The first is institutional mission and funding. The second, which is closely connected with the first, is the relationship of the modeling to policy making processes. The third is the relationship between the modeling and how the model output is used. The fourth is the ‘style’ of climate modelling, which relates to different disciplinary, institutional and personal career trajectory backgrounds.
So how can we get back to only one ethic species of scientists, the Feynmanists?